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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID A. MAXWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.

CASE NO:

ANGELINE D. MAXWELL,

PRIORITY NO:

860267-CA
14b

Defendant-Respondent•

Appeal from the Judgment of the District
Court of Tooele County, State of Utah,
Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Judicial Code of the Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3
entitled "Court of Appeals Jurisdiction" effective through
December 31, 1987, states as follows:
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:

(g) appeals
from
district
court involving domestic relations
cases including, but not limited
to, divorce, annulment, property
division, child custody, support
and
visitation,
adoption,
and
paternity; and ...
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This appeal is from the District Court of Tooele County
and involves a domestic relations case, therefore, it is
properly before this Court, which has appellate jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This is an action wherein the Plaintiff-Appellant, who
was the husband, brought an action for divorce against the
wife, who is the Defendant-Respondent, in the Third Judicial
District

Court

of Tooele

County, granting

a Decree of

Divorce to the parties and awarding one-half of Appellantfs
military retirement to Respondent and alimony to Respondent,
all from which the Appellant appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented by this appeal are:
1.

Did the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele

County, State of Utah, retain jurisdiction over Appellant to
make a "further determination" as to the issues of the
retirement benefit division and alimony?
2.
and

Did the Court abuse its discretion in its judgment

order

awarding

one-half

benefits to Respondent?

-2-

of

Appellant's

retirement

3.

Did the Court abuse its discretion in its judgment

and order awarding Respondent $100.00 per month as and for
alimony for an indeterminable period of time?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant and Respondent were married on the 23rd day
of June, 1964, in Elko, Nevada, and there was born one (1)
child of their marriage, to-wit:
born on November 29, 1968. (R 5)

Natalie Nichole Maxwell,
The Appellant filed for

divorce on June 24, 1983, in the Third Judicial District
Court of Tooele County, State of Utah.

(R 5)

The attorney

at that time representing Appellant was Kirk C. Lusty who
obtained a Decree of Divorce for the Appellant on the 27th
day of June, 1983, which was entered

by

the Honorable

District Court Judge, Scott Daniels, on the 8th day of July,
1983, settling all matters between the parties and awarding
to the Respondent custody of the minor child and specific
rights of visitation to the Appellant.

The lower court

further awarded to the Respondent the sum of $300.00 per
month as and for child support for the minor child of the
parties.

No alimony was awarded to either party.

was awarded his military retirement.

(R 16,17)

Appellant

The divorce

was to become effective ninety (90) days from the date of
the hearing.

(R 16)
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Thereafter Defendant-Respondent filed a Motion to set
aside the Decree of Divorce, which Motion was heard on the
22nd day of August, 1983, pursuant to notice.

(R 18)

The

Court entered its Order September 15, 1983, by and through
the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge Presiding, following
the hearing, which set aside portions of the previously
entered Decree of Divorce concerning the parties1 property
and alimony, and retaining the remainder of the Decree,
including but not limited to, the divorce granted to Plaintiff and the child support granted to Defendant.

(R 26,27)

A trial on the issues raised by the Order that were set
aside, including the parties' property and alimony, was to
take place within ninety (90) days of the Order.

(R 26)

Concurrently the parties, by and through their respective
attorneys, Kirk C. Lusty for Plaintiff, and Rick Higgins for
Defendant, stipulated to a Motion to extend the time in
which the Divorce Decree and the matter would become final
from October

8, 1983 to January

1, 1984.

(T 31)

The

Stipulation was so ordered and granted by the Tooele District Court on October 3, 1983, such that the Divorce Decree
did not become final until January 1, 1984.

(R 34)

Thereafter on or about the 17th day of October, 1983,
notice of a trial scheduled for November 21, 1983, had been
sent to the respective parties1 counsel on the remaining
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issues of property and alimony.
respective

parties, by

and

(R 30)

through

Thereafter the

their

counsel, did

stipulate to a Motion to Continue before the Court for a
continuance of the November 21, 1983, trial concerning the
remaining issues of the property of the parties and alimony
without date inasmuch as the parties were uncertain of the
need of a trial or further litigation in the action.
32,33)

(R

The lower Court on November 14, 1983, ordered that

the trial currently set for November 21, 1983, be and was
thereby continued without date, leaving counsel to certify
when the matter was ready if a trial became necessary.

(R

32)
In the meantime, Appellant accepted a job through the
United States Air Force as an employer in Okinawa, Japan, in
February of 1984.

In September of 1984, Respondent moved to

Okinawa, Japan, in an attempt to "reconcile".

(Tr. 15)

In

February of 1985, the parties decided to proceed with a
"full divorce" in Okinawa.

(Tr. 15, 16)

Respondent re-

tained an attorney in Okinawa and had divorce papers prepared divorcing

the parties and deciding

property settlement and alimony.

all

(Tr. 16, 29)

issues of
Respondent

then returned to the United States in January of 1986, and
sometime thereafter retained present counsel for Respondent,
M. Don Young, as her attorney, who entered his appearance as
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her counsel on the 11th day of March, 1986, in this proceeding, also requesting Appellant to obtain counsel for further
proceedings in the Lower Court, sending notice to Appellant
in Japan to appoint new counsel, even though Plaintiff's
counsel had not withdrawn.
On

the

2nd day

(R 35,36,37)

of July, 1986, Respondent, by and

through her attorney, filed
Appellant's

failure

to

a Motion for Sanctions for

answer

Respondent's

Request

for

Production of Documents that was mailed to the Plaintiff in
Okinawa, Japan.

The Motion was noticed for hearing for the

28th day of July, 1986.

(R 54,55,56)

Appellant replied by

retaining Pete N. Vlahos to enter a Special Appearance ONLY
for purposes of attacking jurisdiction and to dismiss the
pending matters, and to dismiss the Motion for Sanctions
based on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction.

(R 62-67,75-77)

On August 11, 1986, after a continuance was granted, (R
80,21)
entered

the

Honorable

John

A.

an Order and Finding

Rokich,

Judge

Presiding,

on Plaintiff's Motion for

Dismissal and Defendant's Motion for Sanctions, finding that
the Lower Court had granted the parties a Decree of Divorce
and any after-accruing Decree of Divorce without a remarriage had no validity

or force or effect to grant the

parties a divorce as the same had been granted and by virtue
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of other Orders had become final on the 1st day of January,
1984.

(R 83-85)

The Court further found that by virtue of

the Order the Lower Court had reserved jurisdiction over the
issues of property division and alimony, and ordered that
the matter be set on the Court calendar for September 12,
1986, for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the remaining
issues of division of the parties1 property, including the
division of Appellant's military retirement and whether and
how much alimony should be awarded to the Respondent.

(R

83-85)
The hearing was held on Friday, September 12, 1986 f
before

the

Honorable

John

A.

Rokich, Judge

Presiding.

Testimony was proffered by the parties' respective counsel.
(Tr. 13)
unable

Defendant was present, but the Plaintiff was

to attend

Plaintiff's

from Japan

counsel

was

due

denied

to his employment and
an

earlier

request

for

continuance of the evidentiary hearing until the end of
September, 1987 in order for Plaintiff to attend.

(Tr. 13,

27)
Proffered testimony from Defendant indicated that the
"marriage"

started

having

problems

and

that

Plaintiff

insisted upon Defendant obtaining a divorce because Defendant could not stay on base or continue with her job without
some sort of divorce paperwork being processed or otherwise
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she would have to return without a job to the United States.
(Tr. 16)

The parties then obtained

a divorce in Japan

through the services of a Japanese attorney.
Defendant's

attorney

then

proffered

(Tr. 16)
testimony

that

Defendant had consulted with the staff Judge Advocate at the
Air Force Base

in Okinawa

indicating

that by Defendant

consenting to the divorce she would receive paperwork that
would enable her to maintain separate housing but it would
not affect any rights concerning the alimony or property
division.

(Tr. 17)

Plaintiff's counsel was not given an

opportunity to cross examine.

Defendant's counsel further

proffered testimony that the Plaintiff was in the military
for 19 years of their marriage.

(Tr. 22)

Following the

proffered testimony without cross examination, the lower
Court ordered that Defendant was entitled to one-half of
Plaintiff's military retirement but then reconsidered that
order indicating that he would follow the formula established by the Utah Supreme Court for award of military
retirement benefits.
Defendant

one-half

(Tr. 33) ... but ultimately awarded to
of

Plaintiff's

military

retirement

benefits without reference to any type of formula.

(R 87)

Testimony was also proffered by Defendant's counsel in
regards to an award of alimony to which the lower Court
Judge responded that he was not inclined at this juncture to
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make a substantial award of alimony, (Tr. 31) and ultimately
awarded Defendant $100.00 per month for an indeterminable
amount of time. (R 87)
The lower Court's final judgment and order found that
that Court had reserved and retained jurisdiction of the
matters

of

property

division

including

the

Plaintiff's

retirement and Defendant's right to alimony from Plaintiff,
and that the purported Japanese divorce had no effect and
was void ab initio because the Utah divorce had been entered
in the matter and became final on January 1, 1984.
92,93,94)

(R

The lower Court awarded to the Defendant 50% of

the Plaintiff's disposable military retirement pay, paid
directly to Defendant and further awarded to Defendant the
sum of $100.00 per month as and for alimony.

(R 92,93,94)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.
The lower Court did not retain jurisdiction of Appellant to make a further determination as to the issues of
retirement and alimony.
POINT IA.
The principal of "Comity" denies the lower Court any
further jurisdiction over Appellant or Respondent to make a
further determination as to the issues of retirement and
alimony because the foreign Court of Japan had already made

-9-

a final determination as to those issues and are entitled
the doctrine of res judicata as much as any other foreign
Decree.
POINT IB.
Appellant's counsel entered a Special Appearance solely
for purposes of contesting

jurisdiction

and raising the

affirmative defense of res judicata and not to litigate the
issue of property division and alimony which were ultimately
decided by the Court on September 12, 1986, constituting an
abuse of discretion.
POINT II,
The lower Court abused its discretion and ruled contrary to Utah law in awarding to Respondent 50% of Appellant's military retirement benefits, especially in light of
the Woodward formula and a lack of evidence as to Appellant's time in the military as compared to his time in the
military while married.
POINT III.
The lower Court abused its discretion by awarding to
the Respondent $100.00 per month as and for alimony for an
indeterminable amount of time based on the needs of the
spouse, her ability to work, and the ability of the paying
spouse to pay the alimony.
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ARGUMENTS
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT TO MAKE A "FURTHER
DETERMINATION" AS TO THE ISSUES OF
RETIREMENT AND ALIMONY.
POINT IA.
THE PRINCIPAL OF "COMITY" DENIES THE
LOWER COURT ANY FURTHER JURISDICTION
OVER APPELLANT OR RESPONDENT TO MAKE A
"FURTHER DETERMINATION" AS TO THE ISSUES
OF RETIREMENT AND ALIMONY.
The Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon in the case
of^Redfox and Redfox, 542 P.2d 918 (Or. App. 1975) held that
a divorce consummated in an Indian tribal court although not
entitled

to

the

same

"full

faith

and

credit"

accorded

decrees rendered in sister states, was "entitled to the same
deference shown decisions of foreign nations as a matter of
comity".

That Court further held as follows:
The rule of general application is that
a judgment rendered by a court of a
foreign nation is entitled to recognition to the same extent and with as
broad a scope as it has by law or usage
in the courts of jurisdiction where
rendered if: (1) the foreign court
actually had jurisdiction over both the
subject matter and the parties; (2) the
decree was not obtained fraudulently;
(3) the decree was rendered under a
system of law reasonably assuring the
requisites of an impartial administration of justice - due notice and a
hearing; and (4) the judgment did not
contravene the public policy of the
jurisdiction in which it is relied upon.
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The Appellant and the Respondent in order to once and
for all finally terminate any relation they had between
themf and make a final disposition of all claims between
them, sought a divorce in the foreign courts of the nation
of Japan with assistance of a Japanese attorney and the
Staff

Judge Advocate

stationed

in

Japan.

with

the

Respondent

United

States Air

retained

the

Force

attorney.

Affidavits and documents submitted by Appellant's counsel in
the lower Court, particularly a letter from Respondent's
attorney in Japan, Mr. Makoto Tanizoe, indicates that the
Respondent hired him herein and was the petitioner in the
foreign divorce action and that Respondent was repeatedly
asked about any and all desires she had at that time in
regards to any alimony or monetary claims that she had from
the Appellant in this action, David A. Maxwell.
In her response to her Japanese attorney's request and
repeated questions by the Judge as to whether or not there
were any other conditions she would like to ask the Court,
aside from the stipulations and the mutual consent agreement, the Appellant and Respondent on April 1, 1985, mutually consented that both parties waived any alimony or monetary claims from each other, including Appellant's military
retirement benefits which is property.
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The lower Court in 1983 at Respondent's request and by
and through her attorney at that time, was granted a Motion
to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce allowing her to proceed
contrary

to her previous wishes, for

property

of

the

parties

including

retirement benefits and alimony.

a portion of the

Appellant's

military

Thereafter in April of

1985, for a second time, Respondent after consultation with
her

Japanese

attorney

and

repeated

questioning

by

the

Japanese Judge, consented to waive any rights in alimony or
any other monetary claims that she may have had against
Appellant David A. Maxwell.

Respondent through proffered

testimony indicated in the trial record pages 16 and 17,
that both her Japanese

attorney

and

the Judge Advocate

indicated that the divorce in Japan would have no effect on
any

rights

concerning

the

alimony

or

property

division

because the Japanese Court had no jurisdiction over them.
The mutual consent agreement presented to the Japanese Court
and reviewed by its Judge, and the letter from Respondent's
attorney as Petitioner, indicate exactly to the contrary
that alimony and any monetary claims were settled by that
Court.
Approximately one (1) year after the Japanese divorce,
Respondent

returns

to

the United

States, hires

another

attorney in Tooele County and again pursues a division of
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the property and claims of alimony against the Appellant
asking the lower Court to void and declare null any and all
proceedings held in the foreign Court to which she had fully
consented and actually petitioned the Court there for a
determination as to alimony and monetary claims.
Once again, the Respondent is in effect asking the
lower Court in this matter to set aside a Decree of Divorce
that has made a further determination as to alimony and
monetary claims between the parties, having changed her mind
once again, and requesting alimony and a division of all
marital properties almost three (3) years after the parties
determined that a trial would not be necessary to settle
those issues

in the

lower Court because

they would be

resolved between the parties.
"Comity" is simply a recognition that one nation allows
within

its

territory

to

the

legislative,

executive

or

judicial acts of another nation, having due regard to both
international duty and convenience, and to their rights of
its own citizens or other persons who are under the protection of its laws as stated in Redfox and Redfox, supra,
at 921.

The requirements of comity have been met in this

matter, both parties were on notice and mutually agreed to
the effects of the foreign Decree settling the issue of
alimony and monetary claims, and for the lower Court to deny
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or declare that Decree void ab initio as to all aspects is a
clear abuse of the lower Court's discretion and denies the
application and principle of comity as accorded to foreign
nations.
POINT IB.
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL ENTERED A SPECIAL
APPEARANCE
SOLELY
FOR
PURPOSES OF
CONTESTING JURISDICTION AND NOT TO
LITIGATE THE ISSUES OF PROPERTY DIVISION
AND ALIMONY.
The Utah

Supreme

Court

in the

case of Dennett v.

Powers, 536 P.2d 135 (Utah 1975) , held that the Defendants
did not reconfer jurisdiction on the Court when they appeared specially by counsel to move that a Complaint be
dismissed.
In the instant case, Appellant retained the services of
Pete N. Vlahos to enter his Special Appearance to attack the
grounds of jurisdiction over the Appellant and assert the
defense of res judicata in that the issue of alimony and
monetary claims had been previously decided by a foreign
Court.

The lower Court after denying Appellant's counsel's

request for a continuance so that Appellant could be in
attendance at a later hearing, continued its appearance at
the September

12, 1986, hearing

to continue

to contest

jurisdiction and assert the defense of res judicata only on
a Special Appearance basis.

The lower Court found at that
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hearing that the foreign Decree was void ab initio, finding
the Court had jurisdiction over the Appellant, and then
further found that Respondent was entitled to one-half of
Appellant's military retirement and $100.00 per month as and
for alimony.

The Court had stated at the conclusion of the

August 11, 1986, hearing on Appellant's Motion to Dismiss
and Defendant's Motion for Sanctions, that the Court wanted
to know the facts with regard to what was done in the
Okinawa proceeding so that he could know whether or not
Respondent had at any time before the Court said "I waive
all my rights and any I may have with regards [to alimony or
Appellant's

military

retirement

benefits]".

The

Court

further indicated that if at any time they agreed to waive
all of that then the Court could see no way that he could
impose sanctions and that the lower Court didn't think it
could make a ruling without knowing all of the facts in the
case.

The Court then continued the matter to September 12,

1986, for a determination as to those motions and not for a
determination as to an actual division of the property and
alimony.
The lower Court abused its discretion in assuming it
had jurisdiction to award a property division and alimony to
Respondent at the September 12, 1986, hearing when Appellant
was not present

in person

and was only represented by
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counsel on a Special Appearance basis to contest jurisdiction and raise the defense of res judicata.

POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND RULED CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW IN
AWARDING TO RESPONDENT 50% OF APPELLANT'S MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Woodward v.
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), held in regards to a
division

of

government

retirement

benefits

at

page

433

through 434 as follows:
"... Thus, the wife is entitled to share
in that portion of the benefits to which
the rights accrued during the marriage. ..
The order should be modified for
the wife to receive one-half of the
benefits accrued during the marriage,
regardless of the length of time the
husband continues in the same employment. [Emphasis added]
Whenever the
husband choses to terminate his government employment, the marital property
subject to distribution is a portion of
the retirement benefits represented by
the number of years of the marriage
divided by the number of the years of
the husband's employment. The wife is
entitled to one-half of that portion
pursuant to the award of the trial judge
in this case, which our modification is
intended to sustain."
In the instant case, testimony was proffered to the
Court that the parties were married during 19 years of the
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total time Appellant spent in the military.

No evidence was

taken under oath and no cross examination was allowed.

The

record is void as to the actual amount of time the Appellant
spent in the military, which is presumably more than the 19
years because 20 years are required for retirement and may
have been considerably

more than that time period, but

because of the lower Court's refusal to allow continuance of
the matter until such time as the Appellant could appear in
person, and again, contrary to the Special Appearance basis
of Appellant's counsel, neither the lower Court nor this
Court could use the Woodward formula to calculate the actual
military retirement benefits to which the Respondent would
be entitled.
The lower Court indicated at the time of the September
12, 1986, hearing on page 33 of the trial record, that he
would make an Order entitling Respondent to one-half and
then he rephrased it indicating "I think there's a formula
for that case, a formula with regard to division", and that
the lower Court Judge would consider that formula referring
to the Woodward case in making an award of the retirement
benefits.
Ultimately

the lower Court Judge rendered

a Minute

Entry at page 87 of the record by simply awarding Respondent
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one-half of the retirement of Appellant without any reference to a formula.
The lower Court's decision awarding one-half of Appellant's

retirement

to Respondent without

reference

to the

formula or the Woodward case is contrary to well established
law and clearly
should

be

an abuse of discretion of the Court and

reversed

and

remanded

to

the

lower

Court

for

Jeppson

v.

further testimony to properly establish a formula,
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
AWARDING TO THE RESPONDENT $100.00 PER
MONTH AS AND FOR ALIMONY FOR AN INDETERMINABLE AMOUNT OF TIME.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

in

the

case

of

Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984) , held that the criteria to
be considered in awarding alimony include:
The financial conditions and needs of
the wife, considering her station in
life; her ability to produce sufficient
income for herself; and the ability of
the husband to provide support.
The recent Utah Supreme Court case of Paffel v. Paffel, 732
P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), reiterated this by stating the following:
"In deciding whether or not to award
spousal support and, if so, in what
amount, the trial court must consider
the financial condition and needs of the
spouse claiming support, the ability of
that spouse to provide sufficient income
for him or herself, and the ability of
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the responding spouse to provide the
support.
Failure to consider these
factors constitutes an abuse of discretion. "
There is no testimony proffered or on record indicating
what the actual income of the Appellant is other than that
offered by Respondent.

Appellant's counsel did request a

continuance of the September 12th hearing until the end of
September at which time Appellant could be present in person
to testify, but that request for continuance was denied.
This left the Court with the proffered testimony of the
Respondent .as to her income and the estimated and guessed
income of the Appellant.
The Respondent, through her attorney, proffered testimony that her income was $1,555.73 gross with a net income
of $1,137.28.
26 years.

(Tr. 18)

(Tr. 21)

She had also worked for a period of

Respondent was only 49 years of age and

though she was suffering from certain nervous and psychological disorders, she was currently employed.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Delatore v.
Delatore, 680 P.2d 27 (Utah 1984), held that an award to the
Plaintiff-wife of $200.00 per month alimony for a period of
24 months was not an abuse of discretion and affirmed that
order.

That case involved a Defendant husband who had been

employed with the same employer for 34 years, had gained
valuable seniority, and at the time of the trial was making
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approximately

$27,200.00

annually

in

gross

wages,

and

additionally had minor sources of additional income from the
sale of property and rents.

The Defendant-wife was found to

be employable and in fact had been employed during part of
the marriage, but at the time she was unemployed and was
suffering from several health problems.

During the marriage

one of her kidneys had been removed, she was presently under
a doctor's care for disorders in the other kidney and her
stomach, she had no medical or hospital insurance, she had
no place of her own to live and was residing with one of her
children.

She did anticipate obtaining employment but at

her last job had earned only $4.25 per hour and the award of
alimony of $200.00 per month for two (2) years was given to
her to cushion her return to employment and self-sustaining
status.
In the instant case, the Appellant/husband has also
been employed for several years, has an income annually as
well as a pension income from military retirement.

The

Respondent is presently working, is only 49 years of age,
and has health problems as did the Plaintiff in Delatore.
Additionally, the Respondent in this case is employed, has a
gross income of over $1,500.00 per month and is not working
for $4.25 per hour.

-21-

The lower Court has abused its discretion in failing to
consider all three (3) factors in arriving at a decision as
to alimony.

The lower Court failed to properly consider the

ability of the Respondent to provide sufficient income for
herself, and especially in light of an award of one-half of
the Appellant's military retirement benefits. Therefore the
decision to award $100.00 per month as and for alimony to
the Respondent for an indeterminable amount of time should
be reversed.
CONCLUSION
It

is

submitted

to

this

Honorable

Court

that the

husband has suffered a clear abuse of discretion of the
Court as evidenced by the judgment of the Court as set forth
hereinabove

in

this

brief.

This

Court

also

has

an

obligation to extend the principal of "comity" to a foreign
nation, especially under the circumstances where' the parties
as citizens of this country with the intention of settling
any and all claims to alimony and other monetary aspects in
good faith consulted foreign divorce Court with counsel from
a local Japanese attorney and assistance from a U.S. Judge
Advocate.
lished

To decide otherwise would be to deny well estab-

principals

of

"comity".

The

Appellant

appeared

before this Court through his counsel only on a Special
Appearance basis to contest jurisdiction and argue a defense
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of res judicata, while the lower Court declared the foreign
Decree void

ab initio, and

further, determination

in the

absence of Appellant after having requested a continuance
until Appellant could be present in person, awarded one-half
of

Appellant's

existing
figures

State
to

military

retirement

law without

use

in

that

benefits

the use of

formula, and

a

contrary

formula

further

to

or

the

abused

its

discretion in awarding to Respondent $100.00 per month as
and for alimony for an indeterminate amount of time when the
Respondent was capable of employment, was employed, had an
income and was only 49 years of age.
The decision of the lower Court due to its abuse of
discretion should be reversed, or in the very least, remanded to the lower Court for further testimony and a proper
determination as to military retirement benefits and alimony
if this Court should fail to recognize the mutually agreed
to foreign Decree as having been a final determination as to
alimony

and

any

monetary

claims

the parties

had

between

them.
RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this

^

day of September,

1987.
VLAHOS & SHARP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

y

day of September,

1987, I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above
and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT by placing same in the U.S.
Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following:

M. Don Young
MOHLMAN & YOUNG
Attorney for Respondent
250 South Main Street
Tooele, Utah 84074
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ADDENDUM
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached.
Order and Judgment attached.
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M. DON YOUNG - #3594
MOHLMAN AND YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
250 South Main Street
Tooele, Utah 84074
Telephone: 882-1618
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
DAVID A. MAXWELL,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND

Plaintiff,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

Civil No. 83-224

ANGELINE B. MAXWELL,
Defendant.
—ooOoo—

This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable John A. Rokich,
Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 12th day of September, 1986, the Court
having previously entered its Findings and Order that the above-entitled Court
reserved and retained jurisdiction of the matters of property division including
the plaintiff's retirement and the defendant's right to alimony from the
plaintiff and that a purported Japanese divorce had no effect and was void ab»
initio because the Utah divorce which was entered in the above-entitled matter
was entered and became final 1st day of January, 1984 which was prior to the
purported Japanese divorce; which later Japanese divorce was unecessary because
M *. VOlT
VN A T LAW
Til MAIN
I T A I I IM4J74
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the parties never remarried after the Utah divorce.

However, because the Utah

Court had not resolved the issues of property and alimony and retaining and
reserving jurisdiction of these issues, these issues had to be resolved by the
above-entitled Court, for which purpose this hearing had been scheduled.

The

plaintiff was not present but was represented by F. Kim Waipoe, Esq., for and in
behalf of Pete N. Vlahos.
Young.

The defendant was present and represented by M. Don

Both counsels proferred testimony and made argument and being fully

advised in the premises, the Court enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff 1 s present address is:

Kadena Air Base; Okinawa,

Japan; PSC1 Box 28102; APO San Francisco 96230; and his Social Security Number
is 459-62-3001.
!

2.

The defendant's present address is: P.O. Box 288; Eureka, Utah

3.

The plaintiff and defendant were married at Elko, Elko County,

J 84628.

Nevada on the 23rd day of June, 1964 and their divorce became final on the 1st
day of January, 1984, but, though granting a divorce, the Court previously had
not resolved the issues of property division and alimony and the Court retained
!jurisdiction of these matters to resolve them.
I

4.

During the course of the marriage, the plaintiff served

|approximately nineteen years in military service and retired from military
[service shortly before the divorce of the parties became final.

The plaintiff

'qualified for and accumulated military retirement benefits as a result of

2

(serving twenty or more years in military service^
5. Said military retirement benefits, as allowed by federal law, are
marital property subject to division by the above-entitled Court.
6.

It is fair and equitable that, pursuant to federal law and state

law, that the defendant should be awarded fifty percent (50%) of the plaintiff's
disposable military retirement pay and that the same should be paid directly to
the defendant from the appropriate military service finance center as allowed bw
federal law in the case of a military service marriage in excess of ten years as
this marriage was,
7.

The Court further finds that the defendant has serious medical

problems including chronic bulimia and chronic anexoria nervosa that are likely
to require continued medical attention which may in the future jeopardize her
employment. However, at the present time, the defendant has a good job with a
gross income from her employment of $1,555.03 per month. Based on the fact that
this is a long-term marriage and on defendant's present income, the Court should
award the defendant the nominal sum of $100.00 per month as and for alimony with]
the possibility that the same may be modified or terminated in the future
i|depending on the circumstances of the parties.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court issues the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The defendant should be awarded fifty percent (50%) of the
plaintiff, David A. Maxwell's, disposable military retirement pay and the same
<J4*YOrNO
VH A T LAW
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3

should be paid directly to her by the appropriate military financial center as
follows:

Angeline B. Maxwell, P.O. Box 288, Eureka, Utah 84628 or such other

address as she shall designate from time to timel
2.

The plaintiff should be further ordered to pay to the defendant the

sum of $100,00 per month as and for alimony, the same to be due and payable on
or about the 1st day of each month with the first payment due on or about the
1st day of October, 1986.
Dated this /S

day of October, 1986.
BY THE COURT

A
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Pete N.
Vlahos, Vlahos & Sharp, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, this ^ 4 ^ day
of September, 1986.
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M. DON YOUNG - #3594
MOHLMAN AND YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
250 South Main Street
Tooele, Utah 84074
Telephone: 882-1618
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
DAVID A. MAXWELL,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Ci^il No. 83-224

ANGELINE B. MAXWELL,
Defendant.
—-00O00 —

This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable John A. Rokich,
Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 12th day of September, 1986, the Court
having previously entered its Findings and Order that the above-entitled Court
reserved and retained jurisdiction of the matters of property division including
the plaintiff's retirement and the defendant's right to alimony from the
plaintiff and that a purported Japanese divorce had no effect and was void £b
initio because the Utah divorce which was entered in the above-entitled matter
was entered and became final 1st day of January, 1984 which was prior to the
purported Japanese divorce; which later Japanese divorce was unecessary because
S* At Y O U N G
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the parties never remarried after the Utah divorce.

However, because the Utah

Court had not resolved the issues of property and alimony and retaining and
reserving jurisdiction of these issues, these issues had to be resolved by the
above-entitled Court, for which purpose this hearing had been scheduled. The
plaintiff was not present but was represented by F. Kim Walpoe, Esq., for and inj
behalf of Pete N. Vlahos.
Young.

The defendant was present and represented by M. Don

Both counsels proferred testimony and made argument and being fully

advised in the premises, and the Court having heretofore entered U s Findings of|
Fact and Conclusions of law, it is:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
1.

The defendant is awarded fifty percent (50%) of the plaintiff,

David A. Maxwell's, disposable military retirement pay and the same is to be
paid directly to her by the appropriate military financial center as follows:
Angeline B.JIaxwell, P.O. Box 288, Eureka, Utah 84628 or such other address as
she shall designate from time to time.
2.

The plaintiff is further ordered to pay to the defendant the sum of

$100.00 per month as and for alimony, the same to be due and payable on or about
the 1st day of each month with the first payment due on or about the 1st day of
October, 1986.
Dated this

/

day of October, 1986.
BY THE COURT
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Pete N.
Vlahos, Vlahos & Sharp, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, this e^/^-day
of September, 1986.
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